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        A Schema for        Depiction
     A b s t r a c t
The article proposes a five-part schema for analysing the design process in construct-
ing visual representations. Its purpose is to highlight the multiple ways in which the 
objectives of a design influence the final form: pictorial pragmatism, driven by the 
objectives, is taken to be the dominant force in determining that form. The schema is 
valuable when considering the relationship between aspects of the reality to be modelled 
and those of the designed representation. While accepting that a useful distinction is 
captured by the terms realistic and metaphorical, an argument is developed that this 
distinction cannot be strictly held. The notion of expressivity is examined and the prag-
matic model of depiction is further explored, in which expressivity is shown to be often 
increased by mismatches between what is seen and its graphical representation. The 
aims of the article are: to question simplistic models of depiction; to provide a simple 
but robust framework for thinking about depiction and related forms of designing; 
and to act as a guide in the advanced education of designers, in particular making them 
aware of the extent of the choices open to them. 
Stephen Boyd Davis runs the Lansdown Centre for Electronic Arts, a University Research Centre at Middlesex University 
dedicated to interdisciplinary work in digital media. He shares the Centre’s commitment to continuous innovation—but also 
sets new media practices in wider historical contexts. His aim has always been to inquire radically into the possibilities of 
media and technologies, exploiting their special properties to the full. In addition to running the Research Centre and teach-
ing, Stephen supervises PhD students who are developing new creative applications for technology. A Fellow of the Royal 
Society of Arts, he is a member of the Peer Review College of the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council, a referee on the 
Scientific Committee of the Design Research Society and on the management committee of the Computer Arts Society.
  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The article proposes a five-part schema of the design process in constructing visual 
representations. rather than emphasizing the relationship of pictures to what they 
depict, emphasis is placed instead on the opportunities for transformation, at a number 
of conceptually distinct phases, between the observation (or imagining) of an object 
or scene and its final representation in a graphic. Thinking of depiction as some kind 
of matching to what we see is a widespread misconception. instead we should think of 
depiction operationally and pragmatically.
  Although the primary example used here is the familiar one of picturing 
a waste receptacle or trash-can which allows the computer-user to delete files, the 
schema is argued in relation to other forms of depiction created for other purposes 
and in different contexts, in order to demonstrate its usefulness and applicability. The 
schema is meant to be useful to the designer as well as the theorist, in particular by 
drawing attention to the freedom and range of choices available, and clarifying the 
purposes they can serve. initially a simple five-step model of visual representation is 
set out, which is then refined through discussion of the issues raised. 
  B a c k g r o u n d
The term schema is used here in its general sense of a structured representation in 
the form of a diagram or plan. The schema proposed is intended to make it easier 
for designers and theorists, to think about the purposes of depiction and how those 
purposes influence—or should influence—the form of the picture. 
  in the author’s experience, working with postgraduate students of 
design and with professional designers, there is a common tendency to think differ-
ently about two classes of graphic representation: on the one hand, figurative graphics 
(referred to here simply as pictures) and, on the other more obviously ‘designed’ 
representations such as diagrams. Picture-making has even been called thoughtless 
imitation when compared with thoughtful diagram design (Kazmierczak, 2001, p.179). 
When people learn to make pictures, there is a strong inclination to over-emphasize 
the relationship of the depiction to what it depicts and correspondingly to ignore or 
underestimate the relationship of the depiction to the purposes it serves. As a result, 
many opportunities for selection and transformation of the original object or scene, in 
order to serve the objectives of the representation, are ignored. 
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  Part of the problem is that there is a lingering hope that pictures 
and other designs can somehow completely capture what they represent. Whether in 
figurative picture-making or in information design, a belief emerges that: representa-
tions can be complete; representations can be unambiguous; and that representations 
match something in the world. By contrast, the pragmatic model offered here is one 
based, to borrow Gombrich’s phrase (1977, p.248), on the dominance of making over 
matching. The term pragmatism is used here to mean a focus on results—a concern 
with what a picture does to and for the user or viewer and with how the characteristics 
of depiction can be understood in those terms.  
  Conceiving representations as designed pragmatically, to inform and 
affect the user, their truth to something external becomes less vital than their effec-
tiveness. This is not, of course, a cynical invitation to lie with graphics, but rather an 
acknowledgement that representations can not be complete, can not be unambiguous, 
that in sum, they are just as they are called—representations. This inadequacy of depic-
tion might be conceived as rather depressing, but it will be argued here that the way in 
which representations fall short of matching what they represent, far from being a cause 
for regret, is a vital part of their expressivity. in fact this is an old idea. descartes (1954. 
P.245) remarked: “very often the perfection of an image depends on its not resembling 
the object as much as it might.” rather than simply repeat this observation, the aim 
here is to construct a schema for the component processes by which pictures relate to 
what they depict and to the objectives they serve, in order to get a better grasp of what 
the picture-maker does. 
A n  o u t l i n e  s c h e m a 
  o f  v i s u a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
Consider the subject matter of a picture, which will be referred to here as the model, 
M. This model may be a directly observable object or scene in the world or one that is 
imagined based on recollection of how things look. The model M is to be represented in 
picture P. This picture P might be a picture of any kind. in principle, the schema offered 
here is applicable to all pictures, even to film and other dynamic images.
  M, the model, itself represents something, an idea, I. This is most 
obviously the case where ostensive subject matter has a metaphorical or symbolic 
meaning so that, for example, a dove represents peace or a trash-can stands for the 
concept of deletion. But even a more literal picture, such as an illustration to enable a 
part in a furniture kit to be identified, is the carrier of an idea. While i is a generalized 
notion, M is a particular instantiation of that notion in an example. some pictures 
are more particular than others: a road sign, a desktop icon or a way-finding symbol 
generalizes far more than a photograph, for example. But the need to choose some 
particular instance of the idea is always there to a certain extent. 
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  the stages of representation from idea to picture can be set out 
in the form:
I ,M , P
  in the case of the familiar trashcan in the computer interface, the three 
phases can be laid out as in Table 1, where a general notion of a trash-can is instantiated 
in some particular model and this model is then rendered as a visible picture.
     
  however, the idea, I, is selected to serve some objective, or set of 
objectives, O, requiring us to add another phase:
O , I , M , P
  While Table 2 now shows the objectives, O, as motivating the idea, 
I, the schema needs still further augmentation, this time at the other ‘end’ of the 
process. We need to represent the fact that another representational process takes 
place between the model M and the picture P. 
  This is because the model M is pre-pictorial and probably three-di-
mensional, but the picture P is flat. Here it is useful, to some extent, to borrow from the 
pipeline metaphor of synthetic computer graphics (Foley et al 1995, p.334-5, 806-9), 
in which it is normal to separate conceptually two sets of decisions in the making of a 
picture: one involves the geometry and other attributes of the model M—whatever is to 
be depicted—while the other relates to the visualization of the model necessary to its 
table 2  All pictures serve purposes. The idea serves to further the objectives of the picture.
table 1  A general notion of an object that has a particular instantiation that is pictured.  
(The trash-can picture is a public domain image by Andy Fitzsimon taken from Wikipedia, 4 March 2007.)
Idea 
General notion 
of a trash-can
Model
Some particular 
instance of 
a trash-can
Picture
Idea 
General notion 
of a trash-can
Objectives 
Enable
deletion
Model
Some particular 
instance of 
a trash-can
Picture
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display, including such factors as point of view, framing and so forth, denoted here as 
V. Each is of course essential. There cannot be a viewpoint onto nothing—the model is 
essential. And the model is useless for the purposes of depiction unless it is viewed. 
  the stages can now be redrawn as:
O , I , M , V , P
For the trashcan example, the five phases are shown in Table 3. This crudely represents 
how the objectives, O, inform the selection of an idea, I, which is instantiated in some 
particular model, M. This in turn is viewed, V, in a particular way and finally pictured, 
P, using certain media, rendering techniques and so forth. 
  such a simple schema does not pretend to capture the subtleties of 
real depiction. For example, where exactly would one place the choosing of a projection 
system, such as a choice between three-point and axonometric perspective? is this best 
accounted for as an aspect of the viewpoint or of the final picturing process? Provided 
the coarseness of the diagram is borne in mind, it may nevertheless be useful.
other simplifications in the diagram include the fact that it shows each of the stages 
as singular, whereas in practice many stages will have multiple aspects: for example, 
the objectives, as already noted, are likely to be many for a single picture. similarly a 
single model may yield innumerable views and pictures and so forth. Another important 
point is that the process shown in Table 3 appears to be linear and uni-directional. As 
discussed later, such an impression would be misleading.
  so far, the left-to-right arrows in the sequence have been left unde-
fined. They might be taken to suggest a logical implication or inevitability, but that is 
not at all what is intended here. Every one of the conceptually distinct phases is an 
opportunity for intervention. Macdonald-ross and Waller suggested in 1974 the idea 
of the designer as transformer, who takes another person’s knowledge or message and 
finds the means to convey it to the intended audience (Macdonald-ross and Waller 
                      table 3  The model, instance of the idea, cannot be depicted without a point of view. 
The selection of viewpoint is a vital aspect of the relation between the model and the picture. 
Idea 
General notion 
of a trash-can
Objectives 
Enable
deletion
Model
Some particular 
instance of 
a trash-can
View
Some viewpoint
on the trash-can 
model
Picture
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2000). similarly, the argument here is that, even in the case of pictures, each transi-
tion should be conceived as a transformation, an opportunity for interpretation and 
expression, not as a mechanical, inevitable mapping. in particular, the transformations 
from the model to the view and to the picture require examination.
  M o d e l  t o  v i e w  t o  p i c t u r e : 
p r o c e s s e s  o f  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
  While it is obvious that diagrams need not visually resemble anything 
which they represent, it is equally clear that for pictures—by definition—some resem-
blance is involved. There have been many discussions of just how these two graphic 
modes may be assimilated or differentiated, on a variety of grounds (Norman, 2000; 
Kazmierczak, 2001). in his Schema for a Graphic Language (1987, p.204), Twyman 
uses a dotted rather than a solid line between the categories pictorial and schematic to 
suggest some continuity between the two. Engelhardt’s Language of Graphics (2002) 
usefully integrates terminologies and concepts from many graphic modes including both 
diagramming and depicting (but does not deal with the transformations of view and 
picture described here). 
  in grappling with these problems, the term automorphism, as intro-
duced by Currie (1995, p.97), is useful: it names the match between a property of the 
thing to be represented and a corresponding property in the representation. Normally 
in a picture, a being to the left of b maps the fact that A is to the left of B in the scene. 
of course, automorphism is not an absolute: degrees of automorphism are common, 
as when the widths of roads on a map approximate to, but do not arithmetically scale 
to, the widths of the roads represented. in the london Underground map, there is some 
automorphism between locations in the city and locations on the map, but the colors 
of the lines are arbitrary—there is nothing red about the Central line itself. 
  Some degree of visual automorphism is definitional for all pictures, 
and if a picture could be a perfect representation of a scene then it would be completely 
automorphic. However, we shall see that no such perfect representation is possible. 
There are two fundamental difficulties. The first is deciding what constitutes the depin-
gendum—the thing to be depicted (this term has been adopted in order to avoid the 
too-specific implications of words like object or scene, and clumsy repetition of lengthy 
phrases like ‘the thing to be depicted’). The other difficulty is in deciding on the relation 
between this depingendum and the depiction. We need to establish the limits of what 
can be done, and by this means to work towards a useful concept of expressivity—the 
ability of a representation to communicate effectively. 
  Pinning down the depingendum. it is often assumed that what is ‘out 
there’ to be captured is uncontroversial but, even in a strictly practical way, it is easy to 
demonstrate that the status of the depingendum is problematic, simply because it is 
Figure 1  The ap
parent truth-va
lue of photograp
hy is misleading
.                           
                            
               (Part of
 an artwork by A
ndrew Kearney 
at Middlesex Un
iversity, london
, UK. Used with
 permission.)
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not ‘out there’: it is inextricably involved with active, constructive perception. it is often 
pointed out that no picture is neutral towards its subject, as for example Kress and van 
leeuwen do when they say, ‘Pictorial structures do not simply reproduce the structure of 
reality. on the contrary, they produce images of reality’ (1996, p.45). But the additional 
point here is that, even prior to picturemaking, perception itself is a constructive, 
selective process. it has frequently been suggested that a picture can imitate reality by 
presenting the same stimulus to the eye as the scene itself (something that the special 
case of trompe l’oeil images really attempt to do). Though he subsequently renounced 
it, Gibson (1954) originally offered just such an idea of a ‘faithful picture’: “A delimited 
surface is so processed that it yields a sheaf of light-rays to a given point which is the 
same as would be the sheaf of rays from the original scene to a given point.”
  A fatal problem with this conception, as Gibson later realized, is that 
perception is not the sum of a series of flat pictures, but the result of an active nego-
tiation with the world in depth. Whereas it used to be thought that, in natural vision, 
the entire visual field is in focus at once—and the history of pictures is dominated by 
images which are entirely focused both in depth and breadth—it is now known that this 
is far from the case. For one thing, the eyeball itself changes shape as it surveys the 
scene, in order to alter the focusing distance (accommodation). And in addition, only 
that portion of the scene which is opposite the fovea is clearly resolved, so through 
saccadic movements of the eyeball the fovea is exposed to different parts of the scene. 
so, both in depth and across the scene, it is impossible for all parts of the scene to be 
equally resolved. However, there is a profound complication to this simple truth. since 
we are not generally conscious of the eye’s altering focus (and never of the saccadic 
movements) it could be argued that a representation which is in focus across its whole 
surface is true to our experience. We have therefore two valid claims to realism. similar 
mismatches of what have been called logical and psychological truth also arise in relation 
to perspective geometry and scale, as noted in very different contexts by Klee (1968, 
p.41) and Gregory (1977, p.174).
  This problem of truth-value arises even in the case of photographs, 
often still regarded as the benchmark of perfect representation (figure 1). Prince (1996:28) 
notes that C.s. Peirce conceived photographs as indexical traces that ‘correspond point 
by point to nature.’ Barthes considered them as operating without a code (Barthes, 1977, 
p.17). such a conception underpins the views of film theorists like Bazin (1967, p.46) 
who often suggest that realism has an unproblematic relation to the scene: we know 
what scenes look like and film should look the same. As indicated above, the disturbing 
but exciting fact is that we don’t know what scenes look like—so we have no way of 
making pictures, or even films, look the same. Even photographs themselves must be 
designed—through the selection of lens, aperture, film stock, mechanical form of the 
camera and so forth—to favor one of several competing truths. 
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  Why does any of this matter? The key point is that we are constrained 
and at the same time liberated, by the impossibility of making a perfect picture, even 
when using a camera. The emphasis must instead be on pragmatics, on pictures which 
serve the objectives for which they are made, not on any supposed truth to an objective 
original. This is largely at odds with the way we are taught to make pictures, where 
achieving some ‘match’ between the scene and the picture is normally considered the 
primary goal. Novice designers are particularly prone to imitating aspects of the real 
world without considering whether or not this enhances the effectiveness of the design. 
visual characteristics then appear in the representation on the grounds that this is the 
way the world looks, not on the grounds of fit with the objectives.
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  P i c t u re s  a s  re p re se n ta t i o n s
— towa rd s  a  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  ex p re ss iv i ty
  in the transformations from model to view and to picture, distortion, 
attenuation and omission are all common. A particularly interesting case is that of what 
might be termed illicit marks—marks with no corresponding presence in the scene. 
Probably the commonest is the drawn outline. so ubiquitous is it in pictures that we 
can easily forget it has no basis in the observed world. Marr’s model of vision (1982, 
p.37) proposed that mental constructs equivalent to outlines are a primary means of 
segmenting the scene at a very basic level, but this does not alter the fact that the lines 
are post-optical: they are not present in the scene. outline in a picture stands for an 
aspect of the world after it has been perceived, after the scene has been processed by 
the visual system. instead of imitating the external stimulus of the scene—the optical 
depingendum—it evokes the cognized, meaningful experience of looking at a scene, 
rather as we saw in relation to uniform focus. 
  outline is a significant example of the ways in which the weaknesses 
of representational technologies are turned to strengths. For example, in some cartoon 
drawings, a shape outlined in black can be additionally separated from the background 
by a white outline (Kurlander, skelly and salesin 1996, p.229). it is also used in graphical 
user interfaces to make the cursor ‘float’ over all other displayed elements. These are 
informational advantages. richards, in a celebration of outline from leonardo to modern 
technical illustration (richard, 2006, p.103), highlights its superiority over purely tonal 
rendering when the structure of complex objects must be conveyed. Through suitable 
use of line, the image can also be expressive in other ways. often lines are inscribed 
onto the surfaces of objects in drawings, which tell us what it would be like to trace 
one’s finger across the surface of the object rather than merely to see it. it is not true 
to suggest that pictures are limited to what we can see: the picture-maker is entirely 
free to embed tactile and other knowledge into the visual representation, and arguably, 
the finest picture-makers do just that. 
  importantly, picture-makers do not adopt a rigorous logic in their use 
of illicit marks. This is another aspect of pragmatism: such marks are usually combined 
with purer optical data in an ad hoc way, which may be driven as much by the ongoing 
solution of pictorial problems as by any preconceived system. Wollheim refers to the 
picture-maker building up analogies between the medium and the object of representa-
tion, seeking an ‘ever more intimate rapport between the two experiences’ (Wollheim, 
1980, p.224), and Podro remarks how ‘line connects shape to movement as they can 
be connected only in drawing. shape and movement become projected onto each other, 
so that while making recognition more replete the image takes on a structure which has 
no equivalent outside depiction.’ (Podro, 1998, p.9 emphasis added).
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  in Figure 2, marks have many functions in a pragmatic evocation 
of experience. They operate in a multitude of relations to the scene: now delineat-
ing the contour of an object, now creating shadow; indicating a surface retreating in 
depth; caressing the cylindrical shape of the foreground logs; selecting telling details 
such as the keyhole, hinges and nails of the barn; making a dramatic contrast between 
the angled stakes and the rectilinear barn wall; evoking the exuberant wildness of the 
creeping plants in full leaf straggling over the building. V and P are therefore representa-
tional transformations, not transmissions. They make it possible for the picture-maker 
to ‘tell’ about the scene graphically not simply to ‘show’ it. To quote richards on the 
art of technical illustration: “The question is not: is this what the component looks 
like? rather it is: does this collection of graphic marks provide the viewer with the 
appropriate information to ‘read’ the illustration?” (richards, 2006, p.103).
Figure 2  Pragmatic picturemaking. The picture-maker’s marks operate in a multitude of relations to the scene. 
(Page from an early nineteenth-century sketchbook, detail. Author’s collection.)
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  E x p r e s s i v i t y  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n
  it is time to be more exact about the nature of expressivity in pictorial 
representation. initially the discussion will concentrate on those aspects of depiction 
that are primarily informational. subsequently, the affective aspects of expressivity will 
be tackled.
  in the context of information visualization, Mackinlay (1986, p.114-6) 
proposes a strict test of expressivity, that representations must ‘encode all the facts in 
the set and encode only the facts in the set.’ This definition harks back to the idea of 
perfect and complete representation which was rejected above. it might be characterized 
in Table 4, where facts in the source are mapped to features in the representation, each 
with its direct counterpart.
  it is reasonable to say, as Tufte (1983, p.55-77) and Wainer (1997, 
p.22-25) do, that for instance, three-dimensional visual representations should not be 
made when only two dimensions of data are available. in this limited sense, it is quite 
acceptable that Mackinlay does not want a representation to introduce unwarranted 
additions to the source facts. At heart, however, Mackinlay’s expressivity is defined 
on the basis that ‘the facts’ can be established unequivocally; that all that ends up 
in the representation was found within the facts; and by implication, that the design 
should act as a channel transmitting these pre-existent facts to the viewer. it is a quite 
widespread supposition that source data has immanent structure, and that design can 
or should transmit this straightforwardly. For example, Card et al (1999, p,10-11) present 
a model of data visualization described in a linear fashion with no apparent place for 
the design process to alter the conceptualization of the data. designers sometimes 
subscribe to a similar view. The designer of a three-dimensional timeline claims, “The 
information being visualized has its own intrinsic multi-dimensional semantic structure” 
(Kullberg, 1995, p.22 emphasis added). This view of information sees representation as 
transparent to content, and content as self-evident in the world. By contrast, March and 
table 4  A mode
l of representatio
n based on Mack
inlay’s definition
 of expressivity. 
Facts in the sour
ce are mapped in
 the representati
on.
Facts Re
presentation
F1
F2
F3
F4
Fn
P1
P2
P3
P4
Pn
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steadman (1971, p.29) emphasise the multiple patterns accessible in a data set—and 
the importance of questioning the pattern that most readily comes to the fore—while 
Kazmierczak (2003, p.46) passionately argues that “data per se is meaningless. it 
merely is a collection of symbols/interfaces, which have been acquired as a result of 
an inquiry. To answer specific queries and become meaningful information, data must 
be organised,” so that the design does not act as a transparent channel for the data, it 
makes the data into information. This takes still further Macdonald-ross and Waller’s 
concept of the transformer cited above.
  Not surprisingly, the lack of a perfect fit between the facts and the 
representation is a source of disappointment to some. in the well-named essay “The 
Problem of representing Knowledge” (1972) the same Macdonald-ross earlier regretted 
the ambiguities and slippage that visual representations of knowledge bring with them. 
Nardi and Zarmer (1993) attacked metaphorical representations in the interface on the 
grounds of their ambiguity and lack of precision, but failed to notice that all representa-
tions are more or less subject to these ‘failings’—because they are representations. 
  A preferable overall model of visual representation is presented in 
Table 5. if the ‘facts in the set’ are considered to be the ideas for which the model 
stands, then a picture can represent more than the set of facts, for instance by 
having both a simple pictorial and a metaphorical relation to its subject. A picture 
also adds to the source facts through reference to common knowledge, including knowl-
edge of other pictures. And a fact in the set, such as the curvature of a surface, may, 
as we have seen, be transformed into an analogous mark in the representation, instead 
of being represented directly. in addition, any picture also presents less than the facts, 
since no representation can show all aspects of the model, particularly when a three-
dimensional world must be mapped to the plane. Mackinlay’s definition of expressivity 
– the facts in the set and only the facts in the set – is clearly wrong.
  The alternative model favored here is a view of design as a form of 
table 5  A modi
fied model of re
presentation ba
sed 
on the ideas pre
sented in this ar
ticle. selective 
observations fro
m the source pa
ss through a pro
cess 
of transformatio
n into the repres
entation, which
 will 
usually both fall
 short of and ex
ceed the mere d
ata.
Facts Re
presentation
F1
F2
F3
F4
Fn
P1
P2
P3
P4
Pn
Transformation
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rhetoric (Poggenpohl, 1998) which places the transformation from content into form in a 
setting of human-human purposive communication. it is design as described by design 
semantics, in which ‘making sense of things’ (Krippendorff 1989) really is considered 
as making, not matching something which exists and awaits expression. pictures are 
created through a series of transformative interventions, just as diagrams or other 
graphics which are more obviously ‘designed’.
  1 .  E x p r e s s i v i t y  r e f i n e d : 
i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  a f f e c t
  so much for informational expressivity. However, a vital aspect of 
communication, in addition to the conveying of information, is affect. Here this is taken 
to include anything which alters the viewer’s relationship to the depicted. 
it is not concerned only with the emotional aspects, as discussed in relation to design for 
example by Norman (2004). While informational expressivity denotes how much the user 
comes to know about the depicted scene, affective expressivity denotes any changes to 
the relation between the scene and the user. Though the two aspects are often closely 
intermingled, it is useful, initially at least, to tease them apart. in each case the location 
in the schema will be indicated.
  Consider the case of selecting a point of view (V) on an object, initially 
in relation to informational expressivity. some views are more significant than others, 
probably because they differentiate the object with greater efficiency (Bruce, Green 
and Georgeson, 1996, p.224)—they are preferable in terms of their ability to convey 
information. Particularly for icons and similar graphics, what is generally needed is a 
canonical view, providing simple object identity without attention to momentary appear-
ances (Hagen, 1980, p.13). To offer an extreme case, if the trashcan discussed here were 
pictured as in Figure 3, it would be a poor representation, inexpressive in informational 
terms. Holmes (2001, p.140) tells how, in his practical design experience, he tries “to 
find the most representative view of an object.” For instance “a true side-on view, or 
profile, of a pair of spectacles does not remind you of spectacles, it’s just a capital letter 
J on its side.” The inexpressivity of some views has been exploited in visual riddles such 
as Figure 4.
Figure 4  inexpr
essive views as 
a source of visu
al humor, a trad
itional visual rid
dle for children,
 
representing a m
an in a sombrer
o paddling a can
oe.
Figure 3  An inexpressive view of the trashcan. some views are more expressive than others.
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  Blanz, Tarr and Bülthoff (1999) have measured the angles at which 
subjects elect to view a three-dimensional model and produced a persuasive illustration 
of the clustering around the particular angles that provide canonical views (figure 5). 
All are views in which the defining characteristics—the overall shape, the spout, the 
handle and the knob of the lid—are visible. Almost every viewpoint chosen is above 
the horizontal. recalling the trashcans depicted in the history of the desktop metaphor, 
each has either been viewed in simple elevation (as in the early Macintosh operating 
systems) or from slightly above. 
  But in addition to the informational expressivity of such a view, is 
there an additional, affective, aspect to this choice of viewpoint? Users should feel in 
control of the systems they use—this has long been one of the claimed benefits of well 
chosen interface metaphors (Carroll and Thomas 1982, p. 112), and to look down on an 
object is to feel empowered in relation to it. The downward view on the trashcan fulfils 
this affective requirement as well as the informational need.
if we turn to the rendering of a picture (P), the drop-shadows ‘cast’ by interface 
widgets in many operating systems perhaps serve some slight informational purpose 
in enabling the user to more easily locate the boundaries of discrete screen segments, 
but they also make the objects seem ‘more real’ in an affective sense. Their arrival in 
the interface seems to have been contemporary with a particular style of book decora-
tion by the publishers dorling Kindersley, which used a similar device to make objects 
on the page seem more object-like and less like traditional book illustrations. it is a 
device that conveys almost no information but makes users feel different about what 
they are looking at.
  while, conceptually, information and affect deserve separate consid-
eration, in pictorial practice, as the examples given already suggest, they often work 
in collaboration. 
  Film demonstrates remarkably how informational and affective aspects 
can become inextricably bound up in a single device. A close-up (V) allows us to see 
the nuances of a character’s expressions (it adds information) but is also affective—it 
forces a closeness that produces effects similar to being near an actual person (reeves 
and Nass, 1998). similarly, moving the focal plane to alter which part of a scene in depth 
Figure 5  The cl
ustering around
 a limited set of
 viewpoints, cho
sen by experime
ntal subjects, 
onto a three-dim
ensional object.
 These viewpoin
ts favor canonic
al views. 
(Blanz, Tarr and
 Bülthoff, 1999.
 reproduced wit
h permission.)
3table 7  Finally the schema is restructured so that the role of both information and affective objectives can be identified. 
in addition, the possibility of ‘reverse flow’ is indicated, for those cases where considerations concerning the ‘output’ alter 
decisions about the ‘input.’
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is in focus (P) is informational, since it allows something else in the scene to be more 
clearly observed, but it also has a strong effect on the viewer-subject relationship—it 
effectively compels the viewer to relate to a particular part of the depiction. 
  Angle of shot (V) is yet another technique which combines infor-
mational and affective expressivity. For example a view upwards to a person in a high 
window may be followed by a view through a window down into the street: the spatial 
relation between them is constructed by the viewer on the basis of the coherence of 
these angles. shot angle here is used an informational device. But, in addition, shot 
angle has a relation to the film-viewer: it is this that causes an upward view of a char-
acter to imbue that character with authority. This is the affective aspect. As Harrington 
puts it (1973, p.77) the filmmaker “tells the viewer how to feel about a character or an 
action by a shot angle.”  This use of viewpoint and other aspects of the transformation 
to “tell the view how to feel” is fundamental to the effective aspect in all classes of 
depiction. every aspect of the depiction is influenced by the objectives.
R e f i n i n g  t h e  s c h e m a 
  returning to Table 3, some weaknesses can now be identified in the 
draft schema. it was noted earlier that there is an implication of linearity. it might 
seem that the objectives O influence the selection of the idea i, but no other aspect. 
Nothing could be further from the truth: in fact, as has been shown, they influence every 
representational transformation. 
  in Table 6, the schema is restructured to indicate this. in the case of 
the example given, the trash-can is chosen to facilitate deletion of files; a particular 
instance of this idea is chosen to evoke a familiar but modern office; the instance is 
viewed from a canonical viewpoint, which also happens to be a downward view, suiting 
Idea 
Trash-can
Enable
deletion
Model
Some particular 
instance of 
a trash-can
Evoke 
familiar but 
modern office
View
Some viewpoint
on the trash-can 
model
Canonical view,
suggest looking
downward
Picture
Render simply,
in a style 
to suit rest of 
interface
Objectives
1table 6  reconstructing the draft schema allows the influence of the objectives on every aspect to be identified.
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the need to suggest that the user is in control; and finally the image is rendered in a 
simple, unadorned way, one that will sit well with the other elements of the interface.
  in the final version (table 7) the informational and affective objectives 
have been separated, not—as already indicated—because they really operate indepen-
dently, but simply to make clear that both kinds of objectives potentially act on every 
transformation.
  in Table 7, another final weakness of the original O , I , M , V , P 
characterization has also been addressed. in the pragmatic business of depiction, the 
flow is not always one way. Frequently for example the model M is contrived in order 
to produce the desired picture P, so the demands of the picture propagate back to the 
characteristics of the model. in the early days of linear perspective, Uccello, in his Battle 
of san romano (c1450), contrived particular subject matter—and placed it in somewhat 
improbable positions—so as to provide plenty of orthogonals projecting dramatically at 
the point of convergence in the center of the painting. An eighteenth-century painter 
might order everything in a picture around the s-shaped line of beauty—again working 
back from the composition to the contents. The filmmaker who wants a low-angle shot, 
up to the face of a powerful character, will position the character high up in the scene, 
so ‘necessitating’ an upward view. Even the humble trash-can may show traces of this 
‘reverse engineering’: once it is decided that the icon will appear low down on the screen, 
this is probably a third factor in deciding that the downward view onto the object is the 
most appropriate. Having a trash-can on a desktop may be strange, but at least the 
point of view is roughly the right one.
  To reflect these ways in which objectives may propagate ‘backwards’ 
through the representational phases, additional reverse arrows now flow upward through 
the schema. 
Idea 
Trash-can
Model
Some particular 
instance of 
a trash-can
View
Some viewpoint
on the trash-can 
model
Evoke 
familiar
unthreatening
object
Evoke 
familiar but 
modern 
office
Looking 
downward
to imply user 
is in control
Model 
with appealing
highlights
Affective
objectives
Enable
deletion
Use widely
recognisable
instance
Canonical 
view for rapid 
recognition
Render simply,
avoiding 
excessive 
salience
Informational
objectives
Picture
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T h e  s c h e m a  a p p l i e d 
  Using the schema we can begin to anatomize the transformations 
employed in the design of another icon. The trash can was a simple icon in which an 
object stood for an action, but often it is necessary to combine more than one element to 
suggest a more specific meaning. in Table 8 an icon is presented where two objects are 
juxtaposed, to represent the action of saving data to long-term storage. one element of 
the idea I is in some ways a fairly literal depiction of the storage medium itself: a disk. 
The other element is, like the trashcan, an object that stands for an action, a pencil to 
picture the act of writing. it exploits the metaphor of writing, since no actual pencil is 
involved in storing data to the disk. Because pencil marks are easily erased it has the 
advantage of suggesting a recording operation that can later be undone. These are all 
informational benefits.
  What, in terms of information, would be lost by using either element 
alone? Clearly the disk alone suffers from the ambiguity that it might denote any of 
a range of disk operations. The pencil alone might be a tool for drawing or for making 
annotations. Together, the meaning is more clear. the combination of a literal and a 
metaphorical element seems quite effective, though it raises an interesting problem 
of viewpoint, dealt with below. 
  in affective terms, the comfortable familiarity of the pencil, the writing 
tool of childhood, can be thought of as tempering the relative ‘foreignness’ of the digital 
technology represented by the disk. 
  An idea having been chosen, particular models M for each element 
are required. The storage medium appears as a 3.5-inch floppy disk, perhaps because 
it is the most recognizable instance of this class of objects, even though the icon also 
denotes writing to other storage media. 
  The yellow pencil in itself is a rich sign. Approximately three-quarters of 
all the pencils sold in the Us are painted yellow. it has been suggested that the viennese 
Hardtmuth Company in the 1890s adopted yellow for its finest pencil to connote the 
oriental source of its graphite, since this was claimed to be the best in the world. The 
color has been described as having become, by the mid-twentieth century, a sign of 
pencilness (Petroski, 1990, p.163). so the yellow pencil is in itself a canonical instance, 
both iconic in informational terms and comfortably familiar in its affective aspect.
  The idea instantiated as a particular model must be viewed V and, 
when using multiple elements, this also means the elements must be composed as a 
visual whole. in this case a tricky problem arises from the literal/metaphorical mix. it 
is necessary to avoid the pencil seeming to write on the label of the floppy disk: this 
could be misleading. so the pencil seems to write, if anywhere, on the part of the disk 
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table 8  From the iSimple System Icons set by dirceu veiga, May 2006. (downloaded under GPl licence from Wikimedia May 2007.)
Model
Floppy disk 
as most 
recognizable 
instance of 
digital storage 
media; 
yellow pencil 
as most 
familiar 
instance of 
its type 
Idea 
Conjunction of two signs: 
1. storage medium: 
disk (noun); 
a fairly literal picture 
2. storage act: 
writing-implement 
= write (noun used as verb); 
a metaphorical 
picture of writing
Suggest simple, 
familiar activity 
of writing
Comfortable 
familiarity of 
yellow pencil
Compactness 
dictated partly 
by aesthetic 
considerations;
bias to 
right-handers 
View
Composition 
of the two 
elements 
and viewpoint 
intimately 
related
Simplicity has 
its own appeal, 
in this case 
an almost childish 
appearance
Enable
saving data
Use widely
recognizable
instance
Canonical 
views of 
each element 
for rapid 
recognition;
composition 
aims to avoid 
suggesting 
pencil writes 
on disk label
Render simply, 
avoid 
distracting 
detail, use color 
and tone for 
clarity
Picture
Affective
objectives
Informational
objectives
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where the read-write head of the disk-drive will operate. There are of course also a 
host of aesthetic considerations, including the need for the entire icon to be reasonably 
compact. The pencil depicted is therefore a short one, another example of the backwards 
propagation of objectives, in this case from the viewpoint to the model. Perhaps the 
shortness also reinforces the sense of a comfortable everyday household object, rather 
than a brand-new artist’s pencil.
  An important issue in terms of affect, is that the composition is later-
ally skewed: the two elements would only be used in these positions by a right-handed 
person. in affective terms therefore the comfortable familiarity that the composition 
evokes in the right-handed majority of users is presumably as irritating to left-handers 
as the dextral bias of objects in the physical world.
  Finally in the rendering of the view as a picture P, in informational 
terms the color of the pencil is an advantage in differentiating it clearly through both 
tone and hue, while in affective terms it makes a pleasing splash of color on an other-
wise monochrome object. As before, a modest style of rendering is chosen: it has a 
simplicity that is almost childlike, a characteristic of this icon set as a whole. 
S u m m a r y  c o n c l u s i o n 
  the schema as finally presented is grounded in three key issues 
discussed above: the impossibility of making perfect representations and the inevi-
tability of mismatch between the scene and its picture; the complex nature of expres-
sivity arising from this mismatch; and the richness of the resulting transformational 
opportunities available to the designer or picture-maker.  
  Picture-making has been conceived here as making an artifact that in 
some way (or ways) makes equivalences for selected aspects of human experience—not 
as matching anything neutrally existent in the world. viewing depiction in this way, 
the designer is empowered. reconceptualizing depiction in terms of expressivity, the 
focus is shifted from the relationship between the depiction and what it depicts, to the 
affordance of certain perceptions and reactions in the user of the resulting image. These 
terms perception and reaction sum up two equally important aspects of expressivity as 
discussed here: information and affect. The picture both carries information about visual 
and other experience and promotes a certain relationship between the user and what is 
depicted. the notion of carrying information is not—as we have seen—a simple chan-
nelling of data from the source to the user. on the contrary, at each stage, from the 
objectives to the idea, from model to view and from view to picture, subtle processes 
of transformation are at work. the proposed schema captures some of the richness 
and complexity of this pragmatic activity.
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